Britain and the Suez Canal: 75 Years of Colonialism & Crisis

Crossing the Isthmus

The purpose of an artificial waterway to join the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, an idea that was first entertained in antiquity, was that ships could reduce their sailing time between Europe and Asia by avoiding the long route around the Cape of Good Hope in Southern Africa. This shortcut would save around 3,000 sea miles of travel from, for example, London to Bombay (now Mumbai). In addition, a canal here would allow East African states to more easily send goods to Europe and vice versa.

The Suez Canal was a great success, helped along by the coincidental invention of steamships.

From the 1840s, an overland route for travellers and trade goods was organised across the isthmus of Suez. This was first developed by the British officer Lieutenant Waghorn. People and goods took a ship to Alexandria on the Mediterranean coast, disembarked and crossed down to Suez using river boats and animal transport like camels, and then boarded another ship on the Red Sea coast to continue their voyage. This was a rather cumbersome arrangement and not suitable for heavier cargo, but it did save four weeks of travel compared to the Cape route. The land crossing was improved somewhat in the 1850s by the construction of a railway from Alexandria to Cairo by no less a figure than George Stephenson (1781-1848), who had built the world’s first passenger-carrying steam train. Obviously, a waterway that permitted the same ship to perform both legs of the journey and carry cargo of any kind would be a tremendous advantage.

The Suez Canal was built by a private French company, the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, from 1859, cutting through the isthmus of Suez. The Egyptian government leased the land for 99 years and took around 45% of the canal company’s shares. Curiously, the British were against the project since they were paranoid that a rival power could seize control of the canal and block British use, or even use the canal to attack British colonial possessions elsewhere. They were also very doubtful that such a canal could even be built. The project was envisaged and then supervised by the rather more imaginative and technically skilled French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps (1805-1894) using Egyptian labour. Fortunately, the largely flat and sandy terrain was not too difficult to excavate, and no locks were needed. The canal, around 100 miles (160 km) in length, was completed in 1869 and opened in a lavish ceremony on 17 November.

The Suez Canal was a great success, helped along by the coincidental invention of steamships, which were capable of carrying far more cargo than sailing vessels and which did not struggle in the difficult sailing conditions of the Red Sea. As sailing ships still made up 90% of the British merchant fleet, then the world’s largest, the Cape of Good Hope route still thrived despite the canal. As time went on, though, and steam steadily replaced sail, the canal’s traffic would grow significantly. In its first full year of service, the canal gave passage to around 436,000 tons of shipping; a decade later, this had rocketed to over 5 million tons. In 1910, over 16 million tons of shipping passed through the canal. The importance of the canal to both Britain and France was reflected in the permanent presence of their advisors within the Egyptian government.

The British Takeover

This Suez shortcut was particularly beneficial to the British Empire with its wide network of possessions in Asia and beyond, in particular, British India, China, and Australasia. For this very reason, the British controversially took control of the canal in 1882. The British government justified the takeover because Egypt, nominally part of the crumbling Ottoman Empire, had bankrupted itself in costly colonial expeditions in Sudan, and there was a nationalist revolt against the government. A British naval force bombarded Alexandria on 11 July for ten hours, firing some 3,000 shells. Then, in August, a land force of 40,000 men commanded by Garnet Wolseley (1833-1913) captured the canal. Wolseley next quashed the revolt led by Ahmed Urabi on 13 September at the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir. The French government had also wanted to intervene militarily, but the idea was not endorsed by the French National Assembly. Urabi was promptly exiled to Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and a garrison of 5,000 men was established at the canal.

In the absence of any viable Egyptian government, the British government abandoned its initial desire to only take temporary control and instead decided to rule Egypt as a protectorate in all but name. The British thought they could claim some legitimacy to their takeover in the fact that they owned 177,000 of the 400,000 shares in the canal. These shares had been sold by the cash-strapped Egyptian ruler, the khedive, back in 1875 for £4 million (equivalent to over £400 million today). Another, perhaps more important point the British thought justified their act of blatant imperialism was the fact that 82% of the shipping that went through the canal was British-owned. 13% of Britain’s global trade passed through the canal.

The British government was not entirely satisfied with finding itself in control of a bankrupt state, as the historian P. Curtin here explains:

To withdraw would endanger the Suez route to India and annoy Egypt’s creditors in Britain, but to stay left Britain rather than the Khedive face to face with those same creditors in Europe. The result was an informal British protectorate that lasted until 1914 under a variety of legal fictions, a protectorate that amounted in time to British control of Egypt, but with international pressure from other European powers severely limiting Britain’s freedom of action.

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Significantly, most of Egypt’s debt was owed to British banks. The institution of the khedive was restored, but corruption was rife. The British appointed a British officer as sirdar or commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, and the most powerful civilian role was the British Agent and Consul-General, who could appoint and dismiss members of the Egyptian government (including the prime minister) and whose advice was to be taken as unarguable. In practice, the khedive was given a great deal of autonomy, and the British tended not to involve themselves in non-commercial domestic matters such as local government, the legal system, and the police.

The French government, which had long considered Egypt its own particular colonial domain, was not at all happy with the turn of events of 1882. The diplomatic crisis and other unresolved colonial questions led to the Berlin Conference 1884-5, which laid down the rules European powers should follow to acquire new colonies, thus beginning (or at least accelerating) the so-called Scramble for Africa.

By 1888, the British government had come to the conclusion that in order to safeguard Egypt and the canal from dominance by other powers, especially Russia, it would stay in Egypt indefinitely. To reassure its imperial rivals that Britain would not monopolise the canal, the Suez Canal Convention was signed between the major European powers in 1888 in order to preserve its neutrality. The continued friction between the British and French over Egypt was reflected in an exaggeration of their rivalries elsewhere in Africa, notably in the Fashoda Incident of 1898, when France boldly staked a claim to southern Sudan (which ultimately failed).

The Suez Canal was still considered vital to British trade interests, particularly with the development of the oil industry in the Middle East.

A British Colony

Britain declared Egypt a protectorate in 1914 and kept control of it throughout the First World War (1914-18). Also in 1914, the British declared an end to the canal’s status as an international waterway. In the post-war world, the British Empire began to crumble. Egypt was given independence in 1922, although Britain retained control over foreign and defence policy. British military occupation did not end until 1936, with the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. The notable exception to this withdrawal was the canal, which, despite being an international waterway again, maintained a British military presence. The Suez Canal Zone, as it was called, had a garrison of around 38,000 British military personnel. With Italy and Japan embarking on imperialist expeditions in the 1930s, the canal remained as vital as ever if Britain ever needed to quickly move troops to East Africa or the Far East. Throughout this decade, two-thirds of the ships going through the canal were British.

Britain defended Egypt against Italian and German forces during the North Africa Campaign of the Second World War (1939-45). The country was Britain’s main base in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean theatres of the war. The most significant battle, and one which ensured Egypt and the Suez Canal stayed in British hands, was the Second Battle of El Alamein (Oct-Nov 1942) when the British Eighth Army led by General Bernard Montgomery (1887-1976) won a decisive victory against the German Afrika Korps commanded by General Erwin Rommel (1891-1944).

Although India gained Independence in 1947, the Suez Canal was still considered vital to British trade interests, particularly with the development of the oil industry in the Middle East. Through the 1950s, a wave of British colonies gained independence, a situation the British government could do little about since public opinion was in favour of decolonisation and, in any case, Britain was no longer economically powerful enough to maintain a sufficiently coercive military presence across the globe.

After WWII, Anglo-Egyptian relations were again soured by Britain’s involvement in the creation of the state of Israel and its decision to ally with Iraq and Turkey. In July 1956, Egypt’s strongly nationalist leader Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) declared the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. Nasser had taken power in a military coup four years before and had ousted King Farouk of Egypt. Farouk had reigned since 1936, but he had become deeply unpopular, not least because of his pro-British policies. Nasser’s nationalisation was, in part, retaliation for the US and Britain cancelling funding for the proposed Aswan Dam, a project put in jeopardy because it was discovered that Nasser was buying arms from Cold War rivals, the USSR and the Eastern Bloc.

The 1956 Suez Crisis

Nasser’s declaration sparked the Suez Crisis (aka Second Arab-Israeli War, Suez War, or Tripartite Aggression). The canal was still vital to British shipping, especially oil tankers. Anthony Eden (1897-1977), the British prime minister, described Nasser as having “his hand on our windpipes” (Smith, 105). Eden wanted support from the United States to remove Nasser and install a pro-Western government. Eden wrote to US President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890-1969) expressing his belief that Nasser intended to push for the removal of all Western militaries in the Arab world, and this would eventually permit the USSR to increase its influence and presence in the region. Eisenhower, believing firstly that his own public would not condone a military response and secondly that the United Nations should handle the dispute, refused to involve the US military in the affair. In addition, the US was not at all displeased to see British influence on the wane in the Middle East since the two states were rivals for the ever-growing oil business in the region.

Britain, France, and Israel were, nevertheless, prepared to fight for control of the canal and oust Nasser. The British saw Nasser’s brand of pan-Arab nationalism as a threat to their interests in the Middle East, while the French took exception to his support of the FLN (National Liberation Front), which had launched a war in its former colony of Algeria. Israel was keen to deal a blow to any wider movement that might unite the Arab world against it.

In a secret agreement, Israel was to attack Egypt, and so Britain and France could then intervene in the guise of mediators and protectors of the canal. The attack was code-named Operation Musketeer. Israeli forces invaded Egypt on 29 October, and then Britain and France demanded Egypt withdraw its military from the Canal Zone (10 mi/16 km either side of the canal itself). The Egyptian government rejected the ultimatum, and so British and French aircraft began to bomb Egypt on 31 October. From 5 November, British and French troops attacked Egypt from the Mediterranean. The troops landed at Port Said and captured a section of the canal. Egypt responded by deliberately sinking ships in its part of the canal to block the passage.

The actions of the aggressors were widely condemned around the world, including by the United States and the USSR at the United Nations. A UN motion called for an immediate ceasefire. The Suez War, then, ended after just two weeks. Britain was, humiliatingly, obliged to withdraw entirely from the country in December. The Egyptian government promised to compensate shareholders in the Canal Company. The canal was cleared and reopened by April 1957.

Eden’s reputation was irreparably damaged by the Suez Crisis, with criticism ranging from diplomatic incompetence to misleading parliament. Eden resigned as prime minister in January 1957, citing health issues as the reason. The crisis had caused a damaging run on the pound, which was propped up by a US loan (given on condition Britain withdrew its forces from Egypt). Anglo-US relations were subsequently repaired, but many Persian Gulf states were now highly suspicious of Britain’s involvement with Israel in a war against an Arab state. The Suez Crisis was a stark lesson to the British that their days of empire and global influence were all but over; henceforth, only in partnerships with such powers as the United States could Britain ever hope to significantly influence world affairs.